Following the publication of the EU-Mercosur Agreement’s final text, we analysed part of the new texts of the EU-Mercosur Agreement in December 2024. We are updating this analysis in a new note that emphasizes the following points:

1/ The Trade Agreement does not contain sufficient guarantees to prevent the health and environmental impacts expected from its implementation:

• weakness of the clause making the Paris Agreement an essential element of the EU-Mercosur Agreement, which only covers cases where a party would withdraw from the Paris Agreement.
• a vague and non-binding commitment to end deforestation after 2030.
• provisions weakening the implementation of the European regulation on imported deforestation.
• absence of a sanction mechanism for violations of the provisions contained in the trade and sustainable development chapter.
• absence of mirror clauses.

2/ The introduction of a concessions rebalancing mechanism, at the request of the Mercosur countries, is detrimental to the adoption and effective implementation of mirror measures within the EU and in the Mercosur countries. And while European officials assure that it does not apply to legislation already adopted (such as the CBAM or the EUDR) or foreseeable at the date of the political closure of the negotiations, the Mercosur negotiators interpret it in their official communication, as a tool to counteract the effects of the EU’s unilateral measures (such as those resulting from the Green Deal) on their exports.

3/ The Agreement contradicts the EU’s international commitments regarding climate and biodiversity protection and European law. Hence, there is a need to ask the CJEU to examine its legality in light of the EU’s sustainability objectives and obligations in this area arising from European law. This course of action, possible only before the formal conclusion of the Agreement at the Union level, must be used quickly.

4/ The process of preparing this Agreement is a textbook case of democratic deficiency. The final negotiations were conducted in the greatest secrecy, and there is still no transparency regarding the final legal architecture of the Agreement. The Commission seems to want to force the ratification process. Indeed, the EU Mercosur Agreement is, in principle, a mixed agreement comprising a trade and political component. Therefore, The Council must decide unanimously, the text voted on in the European Parliament and ratified in all Member States. To circumvent the vetoes of Member States, the Commission seems to want to split the Agreement to isolate the "trade" part and present it as an interim trade agreement falling under the exclusive competence of the EU. In this case, it would be subject to approval by a qualified majority of the Member States in the Council and the European Parliament. In the event of failure to ratify the political Agreement in one or more Member States, the interim trade agreement would remain in place. This method would go against the Council’s conclusions of 22 May 2018.

In any event, the three red lines drawn by France in 2020 on the agreement remain relevant. Their non-compliance must continue to motivate a definitive rejection of the EU Mercosur agreement.